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The paper reviews the problem of security for computing resources and user data in Grid
systems. It discusses the security related characteristics of Grid system architecture and
provides the threat model. It also considers methods aimed to improve security of Grid
systems and highlights their disadvantages. The Grid system speciﬁcation based on Petri net
is proposed which allows modeling job requests distribution in accordance with requirements
of security policies and formalization of the objectives of Grid systems protection against
unauthorized access.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, Grid systems as type of
distributed computing systems have become
a leading technology which is used to solve
work-intensive and resource-intensive tasks in
scientiﬁc and commercial areas. Due to a high
value of information being processed by Grid
hosts, Grid systems are focused on aspects of
information security.
Grid system architecture reﬂects the
hierarchical organization of the protocol stack [1],
which is based on a set of basic protocols (resource
protocols and communication protocols) for
diﬀerent types of computational resources.
Its upper level is formed by applications that
use resources and communication protocols for
cooperation of Grid system users. Implementation
of any Grid system includes the following
components: computers with graphical user
interface, resource providers, core services that
are run on separate servers. According to the
types of tasks that users can solve on Grid
systems, its resources can be classiﬁed as:
1. Computing resources. These resources are
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used to solve time-consuming tasks that
require signiﬁcant amounts of CPU time or
memory.
2. Informational resources. These resources
are necessary for users of Grid systems, and
are stored typically in remote host systems.
3. Software resources. These resources provide
to the users availability to use software
that is not accessible from their own
environment.
4. Network resources. These are used for
communication tasks.
Resource sharing mechanism is implemented
through virtual organizations (VO), which are
dynamic communities of Grid system users,
united according to the tasks they solve [2].
2. Grid systems threat model
Grid systems are characterized by
decentralized and heterogeneous properties
and high state dynamics. It makes diﬃcult
to ensure the protection of computing and
information resources and to use classical
access control models. These security issues are
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particularly relevant to critical information and
telecommunication systems built using Grid
technology. Consequently, we can highlight the
following set of types of attacks on Grid systems
(generalized threat model built for Grid systems,
is presented in Fig. 1):
 Denial-of-service attacks are network
attacks on basic Grid system services. They
can enforce an authorized component to
disconnect from the Grid system. They may
also cause Grid system overloads, hindering
the work of users and services.
 Malware distribution is also important
problem, because Grid systems provide
legal channels for performing distributed
computing.
 Unauthorized access to Grid system
resources. Can be caused by both
authorized users and components of
Grid systems and external intruders. The
following types of unauthorized access are
typical for any Grid system:
– connection to an unauthorized user
or system component (unauthorized
is a component whose certiﬁcate is
not issued by a trusted certiﬁcation
center);
– attempts to access Grid system user
data by the host processes and host
environment users;
– attempts to exceed authorized access
by the user, Grid system application
or service.
To prevent denial-of-service attacks and
malware distribution, Grid systems engage
software-hardware components called security
managers with installed intrusion detection
systems, ﬁrewalls and antivirus programs [3].
Security managers are connected with dedicated
lines, which broadcast alerts in case of intrusion.
Each unit, having received an alert, duplicates
it to all resource providers under its control.
As a result, all units of the Grid system isolate
the problematic unit, from which the threat had
come, eliminating the possibility of attacks (Fig.
2).
Consideration of services implemented in the
popular Grid environments (Globus Toolkit [4],
UNICORE [5], gLite [6], Gridbus [7] and BOINC
[8]) suggests that security function is currently
limited by authorization and authentication
[9]. These security mechanisms are aimed at
countering attacks of connection to the system by
unauthorized users and components.
Computing platform Grid system is based
on a local network of personal computers, rather
than on dedicated servers (as implemented in the
cloud computing systems). Thus, an important
task to protect Grid system user data from
unauthorized access is to isolate the speciﬁed
data from the eﬀects of the host environment.
Therefore Grid system units employ a trusted
hardware and software platform [10], and help
to protect one from the harmful processes and
unwanted privileged local users from the host
environment.
3. Access control in Grid systems
As a mechanism of user access control,
Grid systems implement information security
policies that govern access rules in the form
of "subject–object–access rights". Compliance
with the requirements of information security
policy is guaranteed through monitoring and
control of user access to data and resources of
Grid systems. Heterogeneity of Grid systems,
having multiple user authentication mechanisms,
and lack of centralized security server make it
diﬃcult to implement classical access control
models. Paper [11] provides a logical model of
access control in Grid systems, which allows
to deﬁne an information security policy in
the Grid system, taking into account diﬀerent
user authentication mechanisms for computing
resources access. In that case, a Grid system is
represented as a set of states. Each Grid system
user may at any time participate in several VOs.
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FIG. 1: Generalized Grid system threat model.
Thus, static description of Grid systems security
states is not enough to neutralize the threat of
attempts to exceed authorized access by users,
applications or services in Grid systems. It is
necessary to simulate the dynamic distribution
of user requests. The authors propose an
approach to protect Grid system resources against
unauthorized access based on secure distribution
of user requests for the provision of computing
resources in accordance with the requirements
of information security policies. This approach
provides the description of predeﬁned relations
in the host environment and takes into account
the dynamics of Grid system states, using
mathematical tools of functional colored Petri
nets.
Grid system nodes (resource providers) are
represented as ﬁnite non-empty set of vertices
M = fmig of Petri net deﬁned by graph c =
(M; T; ) where T = ftig is a set of transitions
between vertices of the graph. Tokens (markers
of) colored Petri nets denote Grid system user
requests to provide a certain type of resource.
Each transition between the vertices of the
graph is represented by probability function (for
example, the residence time of the label in the
queue).
Let us consider the simplest example of a
Grid system (see Fig. 4) with a single resource
provider M1 and three host systems. Generally,
the set of users U and the set of vertices M may
not coincide. This is because several users can
operate the same Grid system node. On the other
hand, some nodes may have no authorized users,
though the computing resources at a given node
may be included in the Grid system. On average,
let one Grid system user refer to one host system.
Let us assume that all user requests pass through
resource provider M1, and only one user U1 can
initiate the task. Yet, the speciﬁed task can be
always performed by other host systems U2 and
U3.
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FIG. 2: Network attack countermeasures implemented in Grid systems.
FIG. 3: Example of Grid systems using Petri nets.
Let ti be a token transition probability
from one Grid system node to another. In this
example t0 = 1, since the Grid system has
only one resource provider, and all user requests
pass through that provider. So, t4 and t5 are
the probabilities, that computational power of
units U2 and U3 will be needed to perform a
user task. t3 is the probability that the combined
computational powers of two host systems for the
user task will be needed. Such situation may occur
when two programs, each installed in its own host
system, are required to fulﬁl one task. t4 and t5 are
the probabilities, that the task will be successfully
ﬁlled on the corresponding host system, with the
required result, returned to the user U1. The
initial marking of the Petri net is characterized
by a vector  = ((M1); : : : ; (Mn)) where n is
the number of positions of Petri nets. For Petri net
on Fig. 3 vector  = (1; 0; 0; 0) is appropriate.
There is, normally, more than one resource
provider in real Grid system, with a certain
number of users connected to each resource
provider (ex. ﬁg. 5). In addition, resource
providers are able to redistribute tasks among
themselves (transitions t31 and t32) in two cases:
1. The resource provider reached the
maximum allowed number of active
requests. In this case the load balancing
between resource providers occurs.
2. Host system, connected to the resource
provider, does not have the right type
(or quantity) of resources. In this case a
subset of queries is transmitted to the other
suitable resource provider.
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Function transitions between vertices of
the graph are deﬁned probabilistically in this
Grid system model. It does not take into
account limitations imposed by the requirements
of information security policies. We turn to
the functional Petri nets, deﬁning the form of
function, acting on the set of transitions ftijg,
so that when one moves tokens from one graph
vertex to another, conformance with the given
constraints is being checked. Consider the set of
Rights (constraints), speciﬁed in the requirements
of information security policy, as well as a set
of predeﬁned Relations, namely a set of queries
(Petri net token), which are currently present in
the speciﬁed Grid system node. Let us set a token
type T = hF; Ai where F is a class of resources,
requested by a Grid system user (computing
resources, user data, etc.) and A are security
attributes that are used to verify compliance with
information security policies.
For example, Fig. 4 shows the tokens,
corresponding to requests for providing resources
of two classes, on the tops of the U1 and U4,
respectively. Security attributes are the user IDs,
which initiated the request: U  A. Applied to
the vertices of the graph c, a tuple T determines
the type of the Grid system computing node.
Moving the user’s task from nodemi to node
mj means the fulﬁllment of suﬃcient conditions
for tij transition ﬁring. We introduce an operator
	 which acts on the set of transitions ftijg:
	: hU; M; Rights; Relationsi!{TRUE,
FALSE}.
Parameters that deﬁne the domain of
speciﬁed operator are variables. Formalization of
the operator, as well as the presence or absence
of these parameters in the range of the operator,
allows us to deﬁne a set of application tasks,
designed to protect resources of Grid systems from
unauthorized access:
1. The task of user requests secure
distribution. Given sets U, M,
Rights, Relations. The presence of
these parameters allows us to build
an algorithm for ﬁnding host systems for
query execution set by the user, taking into
account the requirements of information
security policies. Thus, a prerequisite
secure distribution of user requests for
the provision of computational resources
of Grid systems is performed where each
state of the system meets the requirements
of information security policy.
2. The task of information security
policy requirements veriﬁcation. U, M,
Rights are given sets and the range of
	 operator is known. These parameters
allow us to solve the problem of identifying
the predeﬁned relationships that lead
to deviations from the requirements of
information security policies.
3. The task of Grid systems secure
conﬁguration. U, M, Rights are given
sets and the range of 	 operator is
known. These parameters allow us to
create a description for a safe Grid system
condition, which can then be used to
automate the process of setting up Grid
systems in compliance with information
security policies.
4. The task of identifying violators of
security. M, Rights and Relations are
given sets. These parameters provide the
identiﬁcation of the subjects of access (Grid
system users), performing actions, violating
the requirements of information security
policies.
4. Conclusion
Grid system special service, operating on
the resource provider, performs hosts searching,
suitable for user tasks execution. Therefore, to
solve these problems, the 	 operator must be
integrated into a speciﬁed service. Thus, when
choosing a suitable node, not only the availability
and the type of Grid system resources at the
disposal of the host ware taken into account but
also requirements of information security policy,
permitting or prohibiting the use of resources
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FIG. 4: Types of Grid system resources and computing nodes (example with two resource providers).
on the speciﬁed system node for the user, who
initiated the request.
Formal solution of the speciﬁed tasks
and software module implementation as a part
of resource provider will automate the safety
analysis process and provide a high level of
reliability and security of Grid systems.
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